CrySyS Gauss Detector Service released
We released an online service to check the Palida Narrow font installation on client machines. Details and the tool are available using the URL below.
We also released a Gauss info collector software. Help us cracking the secret USB payload of Gauss malware by running our tool!
http://www.crysys.hu/gaussinfo
Our Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS Lab.) participated in an international collaboration aiming at the analysis of an as yet unknown malware, which we call sKyWIper. We had indications that pieces of the malware was probably identified and uploaded from European parties onto binary analysis sites in the past. Hence, our participation in the investigation efforts was justified by the possibility that one or more European countries may be affected by the threat. Later, we received information that, indeed, sKyWIper is active in some European countries, including Hungary, our home country. This made it clear for us that our analysis results must be disclosed by publishing a detailed technical report on the malware.
Given the limited amount of time and other resources that were available for us, the goal of our analysis was to get a quick understanding of the malware's purpose, and to identify its main modules, storage formats, encryption algorithms, injection mechanisms and activity in general. Our analysis results should help other parties with more resources to get started and continue the analysis producing more detailed results, as well as detection and clean-up mechanisms. The technical report that contains the results of our analysis of sKyWIper is available at:
http://www.crysys.hu/skywiper/skywiper.pdf
Before publishing our report, we alerted the most prominent anti-virus vendors, the Hungarian CERT, and other relevant authorities to the threat. In addition, we shared our samples within the anti-virus industry at the time of the publication. We are ready for further cooperation in the technical analysis of sKyWIper, and for information
sharing with other competent parties.
Update: It appears that the sKyWIper malware is the same as “Flame” discovered by Kaspersky (Kaspersky report) and the malware that Iran National CERT (MAHER) calls “Flamer” (MAHER CERT news).
Laborunk, a CrySyS Adat- Ă©s Rendszerbiztonság LaboratĂłrium (CrySyS Lab), egy nemzetközi egyĂĽttműködĂ©s keretĂ©ben rĂ©szt vett egy eddig ismeretlen malware elemzĂ©sĂ©ben. Csapatunk a malware-t sKyWIper-nek nevezte el az általa használt ideiglenes fájlok elnevezĂ©se (KWI) után. InformáciĂłink szerint a malware egyes komponenseit már korábban feltöltöttĂ©k malware analĂzissel foglalkozĂł weboldalakra eurĂłpai IP cĂmekrĹ‘l. RĂ©szvĂ©telĂĽnket elsĹ‘dlegesen az eurĂłpai fenyegetettsĂ©g lehetĹ‘sĂ©ge motiválta. KĂ©sĹ‘bb bizonyĂtĂ©kok igazolták EurĂłpa, azon belĂĽl is Magyarország fenyegetettsĂ©gĂ©t. Az Ăşj informáciĂłk világossá tettĂ©k számunkra, hogy a sKyWIper elemzĂ©sĂĽnket tartalmazĂł riportot azonnal meg kell osztani a vĂ©dekezĂ©sben illetĂ©kes szervekkel Ă©s cĂ©gekkel.
A rendelkezĂ©sre állĂł idĹ‘ Ă©s erĹ‘források szűkössĂ©ge miatt az elemzĂ©sĂĽnk a malware átfogĂł működĂ©sĂ©re koncentrál, Ăgy a fĂłkuszban a malware moduláris felĂ©pĂtĂ©se, az adattárolási formátumok, titkosĂtĂł algoritmusok, Ă©s a használt injekciĂłs mĂłdszerek állnak. Nem volt cĂ©lunk, Ă©s nem állt elegendĹ‘ erĹ‘forrás rendelkezĂ©sĂĽnkre, hogy az egyes modulokat rĂ©szletesen elemezzĂĽk, cĂ©lunk inkább a további rĂ©szletes
elemzĂ©s megalapozása volt. Az analĂzisĂĽnk eredmĂ©nyĂ©t a következĹ‘ linken találhatĂł dokumentumban foglaltuk össze:
http://www.crysys.hu/skywiper/skywiper.pdf
Az elemzĂ©sĂĽnk publikálása elĹ‘tt Ă©rtesĂtettĂĽk a fĹ‘bb antivĂrusgyártĂł cĂ©geket, a magyar CERT-et, Ă©s más illetĂ©kes szervezeteket. Emellett, a publikáciĂłval egyidĹ‘ben megosztottuk a rendelkezĂ©sĂĽnkre állĂł malware mintákat az antivĂrusgyártĂł cĂ©gekkel, hogy a megfelelĹ‘ detekciĂłk azonnal belekerĂĽlhessenek a termĂ©keikbe. A továbbiakban is kĂ©szek vagyunk az egyĂĽttműködĂ©sre a sKyWIper malware technikai analĂzisĂ©ben, illetve a releváns informáciĂłk megosztásában az erre illetĂ©kes szervezetekkel.
Update: A legĂşjabb hĂrek szerint Ăşgy tűnik, hogy a sKyWIper malware megegyezik a Kaspersky Labs által felfedezett “Flame”-el (Kaspersky report) Ă©s az iráni nemzeti CERT (MAHER) által “Flamer”-nek (MAHER CERT news) nevezett malware-el.
We released a new open-source toolkit to detect Duqu traces and running Duqu instances. Details and the tool are available using the URL below.
http://www.crysys.hu/duqudetector.html
Our lab, the Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) pursued the analysis of the Duqu malware and as a result of our investigation, we identified a dropper file with an MS 0-day kernel exploit inside. We immediately provided competent organizations with the necessary information such that they can take appropriate steps for the protection of the users.
Laborunk, a CrySyS Adat- Ă©s Rendszerbiztonság LaboratĂłrium tovább folytatta a Duqu trĂłjai elemzĂ©sĂ©t, Ă©s a kutatás eredmĂ©nyekĂ©nt azonosĂtottunk egy dropper fájlt, mely egy MS 0-day kernel hibát használ fel. A szĂĽksĂ©ges informáciĂłkat azonnal továbbĂtottuk az illetĂ©kes szakmai szervezeteknek, akik gondoskodni tudnak a felhasználĂłk megfelelĹ‘ vĂ©delmĂ©rĹ‘l.
Symantec status updates, Nov 2
Our lab, the Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) participated in the discovery of Duqu malware within an international collaboration. While gathering deeper knowledge about its functionality, we have confirmed Duqu is a threat nearly identical to Stuxnet. After the thorough analysis of samples we prepared a detailed report about Duqu, named by us. We immediately provided competent organizations with the initial report in order to jointly step up in a professionally prepared way. Our research lab will provide the professional community and the public with all relevant details in the future as well. But we can not reveal further information about the ongoing case. Instead of speculating we encourage all professional organizations to enhance the joint process of finding a solution, since strong international collaboration will remain to play a key role.
Laborunk, a CrySyS Adat- Ă©s Rendszerbiztonság LaboratĂłrium egy nemzetközi összefogás keretĂ©ben rĂ©szt vett a Duqu trĂłjai program felfedezĂ©sĂ©ben. MĂ»ködĂ©sĂ©nek rĂ©szletesebb megismerĂ©se során bizonyosodtunk meg arrĂłl, hogy a Duqu közel azonos a korábbrĂłl ismert Stuxnettel. A minták alapos elemzĂ©sĂ©t követõen, rĂ©szletes riportot kĂ©szĂtettĂĽnk az általunk elnevezett Duqu trĂłjai programrĂłl. Az elõzetes riportot azonnal eljuttattuk az illetĂ©kes szervezetekhez annak Ă©rdekĂ©ben, hogy egyĂĽttes erõvel, megalapozottan tudjunk fellĂ©pni. KutatĂłlaborunk, a jövõben is minden releváns rĂ©szletet eljuttat a szakmai közössĂ©ghez Ă©s segĂtsĂ©gĂĽkkel a közvĂ©lemĂ©nyhez. A folyamatban lĂ©võ ĂĽgyrõl azonban további informáciĂłt nem hozhatunk nyilvánosságra. A spekuláciĂłk helyett a megoldást elõsegĂtõ közös munkára bĂztatunk minden szakmai szervezetet, hiszen a szoros nemzetközi szakmai összefogásra továbbra is nagy szĂĽksĂ©g van.
Symantec report, Oct 18
Symantec status update, Oct 21
We collaborated with our colleagues at UCSD and ICSI, Berkeley to do an analysis that quantifies the full set of resources employed to monetize spam email — including naming, hosting, payment and fulfillment — using extensive measurements of three months of diverse spam data, broad crawling of naming and hosting infrastructures, and over 100 purchases from spam-advertised sites. We relate these resources to the organizations who administer them and then use this data to characterize the relative prospects for defensive interventions at each link in the spam value chain.
K. Levchenko, N. Chachra, B. Enright, M. Félegyházi, C. Grier, T. Halvorson, C. Kanich, C. Kreibich, H. Liu, D. McCoy, A. Pitsillidis, N. Weaver, V. Paxson, G. M. Voelker, and S. Savage,
Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain,
in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy 2011, Oakland, CA, USA, May 22-25, 2011.
The implementation of the defense against Kaminsky DNS attack in Hungary concerns a high number of organizations. The bug is known since July 08, 2008, and since the same date the updated software version are also available. In our analysis we checked whether the authors of the Hungarian DNS servers installed the new software versions, which are indispensable for the protection today.
The results show that about two thirds of the servers are vulnerable. Most of the large service providers have already implemented the suggested defense, but it is not enough for the protection of the users.
Boldizsar Bencsath, Levente Buttyan
Kaminsky DNS Vulnerability - The big companies made a step already, the small ones are slower
(in Hungarian)
| Budapest University of Technology and Economics |
| Department of Telecommunications |
| CrySyS - Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security |